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Abstract—A fundamental Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) char-
acteristic in Cloud Computing is to be application-specific;
depending on the application, Cloud Providers (CPs) restrict
data formats and attributes allowed into their servers via a data
validation process. An ill-defined data validation process may
directly impact both security (e.g. application failure, legal
issues) and accounting and charging (e.g. trusting metadata in
file headers). Therefore, this paper investigates, evaluates (by
means of tests), and discusses data validation processes of popu-
lar CPs. A proof of concept system was thus built, implementing
encoders carefully crafted to circumvent data validation pro-
cesses, ultimately demonstrating how large amounts of unac-
counted, arbitrary data can be stored into CPs.
Index Terms—Cloud Computing, Data Validation, Software-
as-a-Service, Cloud Services, Cloud Providers, Security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud Computing (CC) is a concept that has been hyped to
extremes over the last couple of years. Different definitions,
different characteristics, and different categories (i.e., types
of Clouds or types of Cloud Services) made CC a prominent
technology to be explored from private to corporate users. As
result, a wide variety of Cloud Services (CS) were released
by several Cloud Providers (CP), e.g., Amazon EC2 [2],
Google Picasa [8], SoundCloud [15], amongst others. Cloud
Services can be classified into three different types [3]: Infra-
structure-as-a-Service (IaaS), Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS),
and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS). SaaS is the highest level
of CC, meaning that users do not need to be concerned on
PaaS or IaaS in order to use software that runs in the Cloud.
SaaS features a complete application offered as a service on
demand.
One of the main fundamental SaaS characteristics is to be
application-specific. As the name says, it is software made
available as a service, with a specific purpose and use. There-
fore, depending on the application itself, CPs restrict data
pushed into their servers. Google Picasa is an example to
illustrate SaaS restrictions related to what is pushed to the
application. Within Picasa, nowadays, the user can upload
photos but under certain limitations: just a set of image for-
mats (e.g., JPG, PNG, BMP), resolution up to 2048x2048 pix-
els (under free service plan), file size up to 20 MByte. In
order to enable application-specific restrictions, CPs must
implement a data validation process [21] to verify what is
being uploaded to the SaaS application.
Hence, this paper investigates, evaluates (by means of
tests), and discusses the data validation process of CPs in the
scope of SaaS. The research value and innovation of the
paper relies on answering the following research question: is
it possible to bypass the data validation process to store arbi-
trary data into CPs’ servers? If it is possible (based on the test
results), observe the impacts related to (1) security as well as
(2) accounting and charging. These two dimensions are key
to CPs since reputation and revenue can be affected.
In the scope of (1), a poor or incorrect data validation pro-
cess can lead to security vulnerabilities, depending on how
the SaaS application is implemented and internally archi-
tected — even though this paper does not aim to expose
application-specific vulnerabilities. Also, an input not recog-
nized by the data validation process can allow data injection
to CPs’ servers bypassing content rules and persisting con-
tent that the provider is unaware of. Related to (2), the data
validation process must be aware of consistency. First, it
must assure that what is declared is actually used (or vice
versa). E.g., if an uploaded photo has resolution declared as
80x60 in the header, but the payload data size as 1000x1000
pixels, the image should not be valid. Second, it should be
aligned to what the Accounting System (AS) takes into con-
sideration. E.g., if a CP does not account and charge based on
storage, the data validation process should verify whether
pushed data do not contain an abusive data amount consider-
ing allowed file formats. Thus, depending on how CPs imple-
ment the accounting of resources, a poor data validation
process may impact to what users consume (accounting) and
what they will have to pay for (charging). Based on (1) and
(2), the discussion part of the paper focuses on: how mali-
cious users can benefit of encoding data inside data (bypass-
ing the data validation an content rules), how CPs can have
economic losses (accounting/charging), and how CPs can be
legally affected.
In order to investigate and evaluate the data validation pro-
cess, a set of encoders and test cases were implemented and
performed on well-known public CSs (e.g., Google Picasa,
Facebook, SoundCloud, TwitPic). The tests simulate a user
uploading and retrieving data (i.e., files) via a proof of con-
cept software — developed in the context of this paper —
that constructs files in a particular manner based on different
encoders. Each encoder implements a different technique,
e.g., using steganography [11], or exploring the use of spe-
cific header fields.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II presents the terminology and related work. Section III
describes the methodology for the tests. Section IV presents
the encoders used in the test cases, and the proof of concept
system to automate the tests. Section V describes the test
cases design. Section VI presents the test results, while Sec-
tion VII discusses observed impacts. Finally, Section VIII
concludes what was achieved including future work.
II. TERMINOLOGY AND RELATED WORK
For SaaS applications studied in the scope of this paper,
the common denominator for users to interact with the Cloud
(besides text input) are computer files. A computer file (or
just file) is composed of organizational data and content
data. The former is represented by headers or control infor-
mation, usually following a certain standard. In more general
terms, organizational data can also be called metadata, since
it is “data about content data”. The raw term metadata brings
ambiguity due to different fundamental types, and, therefore,
the term “organizational data” was chosen. The latter is the
data which the organizational data describes.
A file format is a particular way that information is
encoded for storage in a computer file, as files need a way to
be represented as bits when stored on a digital storage
medium [18]. Encoding is the process by which information
from a source is converted into bits (considering a file for-
mat). Decoding is the reverse process, converting these bits
back into information understandable by a receiver. Usually,
a computer file has a file name extension that is a popular,
intuitive, and human-readable method to identify a file for-
mat. It is represented by a computer file suffix separated from
the file name by a dot symbol (e.g., filename.mp3, file-
name.jpg). File name extensions can also be considered a
type of metadata.
Related work has already explored the data validation pro-
cess, but not in the context of Cloud Computing. E.g., solely
focusing on security, Brumley et al. [5] propose a technique
to automatically generate exploits from software patches that
target input data validation vulnerabilities. Yoon et al. [21]
present a framework for the validation of data and rules in
Knowledge Base systems. For the given systems, the frame-
work defines the validation of data, validation of rules [9],
and the interaction between data and rule validation.
Gancheva et al. [7] proposed a data security and data valida-
tion framework for a SOA (Service Oriented Architecture)
based system. The paper explains what are employed levels
of data security: user authorization access, data encryption,
and data validation. As stated in [7], Petukhov et al. [13] also
stresses that the main causes for errors, vulnerabilities, and
consequently serious impacts, are due to poorly or non-vali-
dated data. On the topic of injecting data in Cloud Providers,
GMailFS [19] is a tool that builds a file system using Google
GMail service. GMailFS allows the storage of files, indepen-
dent of their type and size. This is accomplished by seg-
mented email attachments. Even misusing the SaaS
application purpose, this tool does not exploit data validation
weaknesses. In contrast to this paper, GMailFS does not use
techniques to mask injected content in order to bypass CPs’
data validation.
Data validation should be investigated in the area of CC
since public CPs are directly exposed to impacts due to the
considerable number of users, which can freely attempt to
push data to CSs. As far as the authors are aware of, no
research work moved towards the investigation of data vali-
dation process in the area of CC, focusing on real CPs and
CSs, performing tests, and mainly understanding its impacts.
No research used techniques as steganography or additional
optional headers in order to inject data into CPs’ servers
bypassing data validation and content rules. Moreover, this
paper introduces the problem of ill-defined data validation in
the scope of CC.
III. METHODOLOGY
The analysis of the methodology employed to analyze
CPs’ data validation is based on tests carried out on selected
CPs, with different CSs — the selection criteria is described
later in this section. The tests are classified as exploratory
testing, which is defined by Bach et al. [4] as “simultaneous
learning, test design, and test execution”. This means that the
tester actively controls the design of test cases and its execu-
tion, using the gained information to design new and better
tests. As far as the authors are aware of, no research ever
directed test cases to CPs’ data validation process. There-
fore, the selection of CSs, the designed test cases, and the
implemented encoders do not follow any previous results.
A. Test Goals
The tests presented in this paper evaluate if the data valida-
tion process can be bypassed using specific techniques in
order to inject arbitrary data into CPs’ servers. The tests’
goals are directed to two impact dimensions:
Security. Evaluate if a file can carry data (data inside data)
which the CP is not aware of, since the data validation pro-
cess and content filtering system cannot detect it. E.g.,
encode a PDF inside an image file, which is a file format that
is accepted by the CS. Thus, the PDF content cannot be seen
by the CP itself, which may contain, non-authorized informa-
tion.
Accounting and Charging. Evaluate if a file encoded in
different ways, and successfully uploaded to a CS, can impact
on how the CP accounts consumed resources and charges
users. In this case, the goal is to check if a file can negatively
or positively influence the amount of resources the user con-
sumed — also observing if the CP is aware of such consump-
tion. E.g., encode a PDF inside an MP3 file, making the MP3
file very big but just with 10 seconds of audio. In this exam-
ple, the user would benefit of storing an amount of data that
is not compatible to 10 seconds of audio (even though the
MP3 is encoded using the best quality) and therefore taking
advantage of storing data in CPs’ servers. Considering that
the user can store 120 minutes of audio in a free account,
then it could be possible to deceive the accounting/charging
system in order to host many audio files of 10 seconds — but
storing a huge quantity of data.
B. Test Method
The employed test method simulates users pushing and
retrieving data of a SaaS application. After the data is pushed
to the application, this method assumes that data flows
directly through the data validation process. If the data gets
validated by validation rules, it is accepted, persisted and the
SaaS makes it available for retrieval. The reason to also
retrieve the content is due to the necessity of checking if the
data constructed (through the means of encoders, where it
will be discussed in Section IV) was maintained or modified.
The method is illustrated in the following steps:
Step 1. For a particular Cloud Service, check what are the
restrictions to push data to the application. If no restrictions
are present, the data validation process will not be invoked.
Therefore, the tests should consider encoders which may
explore accounting and/or charging impacts. E.g., Dropbox
allows its users to push anything to their account, limiting
only the total space used.
Step 2. Based on the restrictions, construct the data to be
pushed in a particular manner using encoders (cf. Sec-
tion IV). The data should be encoded in order to answer the
research question made in Section I and based on the data
restrictions observed in Step 1. This process is key for the
tests, since encoders can explore detailed factors in the data
validation process.
Step 3. Push the data to the SaaS application. The data
should be pushed following the CS’s API (Application Pro-
gramming Interface).
Step 4. Check if the data was successfully pushed
(accepted) and became available to be retrieved. If the data
was not accepted, the data validation process possibly
detected a rule violation. Therefore, the CS is not susceptible
to the employed encoder constructing the data (unsuccessful
test result). Note that in blackbox testing it is impossible to
observe the exact reasons for the denial. If the data was
accepted, the data validation process is susceptible to the
employed data encoder.
Step 5. In case of a successful push, retrieve the data that
was pushed in the previous step.
Step 6. Based on the retrieved data: if the data is modified
from its original encoding (prior to the step 3) the data vali-
dation process has a mechanism to reorganize the data pre-
venting that malicious users inject data to retrieve it in the
original format. Therefore, the data validation process is not
susceptible to the employed encoder — being impossible to
re-construct the original data again. If the retrieved data
remained the same compared to the step before encoding, the
test case is considered successful. Moreover, if the CP wrong-
fully accounted consumed resources — according to what the
CP accounts and charges for — its data validator led the
accounting system to wrong values.
All these steps are key to evaluate the data validation pro-
cess. However, Steps 1, 3 and 5 are very service-specific and
therefore require a particular effort for each tested CS.
C.Cloud Provider’s Selection Criteria
The CPs and CSs are selected based on popularity. It fol-
lows the logic that widely popular CPs tend to present a bet-
ter-defined data validation process, while, in comparison, less
popular CPs tend to present a less well-defined process. This
paper assumes a higher probability that data validation pro-
cess of popular CPs are refined over time — due to the high
amount of data being pushed, and, therefore, more mal-
formed data reported as not valid. In this scope, popularity of
CSs is empirically measured observing, e.g., number of users,
volume of data pushed, and Alexa rank [1].
IV. ENCODERS AND PROOF OF CONCEPT SYSTEM
Encoders are software implementations that construct files
(data) in a particular manner to test CPs’ data validation.
Encoders are divided into three groups: Steganography-
related (Section IV-A), FileFormatHeader-related (Sec-
tion IV-B), and Appending-related (Section IV-C). The
encoder groups are not only meant to sort similar techniques,
but also to express the level of difficulty to detect files that
were encoded by such methods. The developed encoders are
not an extensive list of what is possible to explore in CPs’
data validation tests, but represent extremes of a trade-off
between computational effort to encode and detect. Each of
the implemented encoders can present parameters, e.g., to
vary the amount of data, to inject data in different headers,
etc. The implemented encoders are explained in the follow-
ing subsections, sorted by encoder groups. Section IV-D
presents the proof of concept system’s architecture.
A. Steganography-related Encoders
Steganography-related encoders use the steganography
technique, where messages (or, in this case, data) are hidden
in a way that intends to turn them imperceptible apart from
the sender and recipient. Steganography was topic of research
[10][6] and depending on how it is applied, it can bring a
high complexity to be detected. In this paper, the term steg-
anography is applied when data is injected in file’s content
data (e.g., slightly modifying RGB bits in images, and WAV
bits in audio files) that is still not perceivable by humans
[11]. 
JPG & PNG Steganography Encoder (JPG-PNG-
Stega). The purpose of this encoder is to inject data (hiding
it) in JPG and PNG files. It takes a File Format Sample (JPG
or PNG) and, for each pixel, it injects 3 bits of data in the
LSBs (Least Significant Bit). There are more sophisticated
image steganography methods already widely discussed [11].
However, the use of this encoder shows that even basic meth-
ods of JPG and PNG steganography are possible in SaaS
applications, and the exploitation of such method may bring
impacts (Section VI and VII).
WAV Steganography Encoder (WAV-Stega). Injecting
data in WAV chunk samples [17] is very similar compared to
how it is injected in image pixels (as in JPG-PNG-Stega).
Based on the WAV file format [14], this encoder checks how
many data samples (audio samples) there are inside the data
subchunk. For each sample (that can be composed of X Byte,
depending on what is declared in BlockAlign field), the WAV-
Stega encoder injects data in the 4 LSBs of the sample.
Text Steganography Encoder (TXT-Stega). The purpose
of this encoder is to hide data in a text format, using Steg-
anography. An English dictionary was used to support the
TXT-Stega, not requiring a File Format Sample. Based on a
sequence of bytes (data that should be hidden), the encoder
generates a text output with English words. For testing pur-
poses, the encoder has a pre-defined mapping table with word
sets that corresponds to hexadecimal bytes. Since it is a bidi-
rectional function, it is also possible to reverse and get the
original input (decoding). Also, this encoder can be adjusted
to generate an output of a maximum given number of bytes
(i.e., a maximum number of characters).
B. FileFormatHeader-related Encoders
The FileFormatHeader-related encoders use specific meth-
ods depending on the file format. The file format header (or
any kind of organizational data) is explored to generate
inconsistencies or to inject a high quantity of data. This
encoder group is classified with a medium detection com-
plexity, since the fields can be verified iterating throughout
the file (considering a standardized file format).
ID3v2 Tag Encoder (ID3-Tag). This encoder injects data
using optional headers of an audio file format. The ID3-Tag
uses the ID3 version 2 metadata container [12] to inject data
in some fields related to the audio file, e.g., title, artist,
album, track number, among others. The standard specifies a
metadata tag size up to 256 MByte. Thus, this encoder uses a
File Format Sample up to 10 seconds of audio file and builds
a X MByte ID3v2 tag within the file. All ID3v2 fields are
used by the encoder. As a parameter, it is possible to specify
the amount of data to be injected in the ID3v2 fields.
Note that this encoder has the goal to exploit the lack of
balance validation between the audio duration, audio quality,
and file size. E.g., a MP3 or WAV file with 10 seconds and
256+ MByte cannot be considered coherent, even if gener-
ated with the best audio quality.
JPG Marker Encoder (JPG-Marker). This encoder
takes advantage of additional JPG standardized markers to
inject data inside an image file. In the JPG standard [16] is
described that the marker “APPn” is application-specific,
allowing vendors to store metadata. The marker is repre-
sented by the hexadecimal “FF En” (2 Byte), where “n” can
vary from “2” to “F” (hexadecimal). Therefore, it is possible
to have 14 application-specific markers in one JPG file. The
“APP0” and “APP1” are reserved to JFIF and EXIF stan-
dards, respectively. Each application-specific marker has 2
Byte to store the data length. For this reason, it is possible to
have 65,535 Byte of data given the data length representa-
tion field. Moreover, there is a marker for textual comments
entitled “COMM”. This marker is represented by the hexa-
decimal “FF FE” and can carry the same amount of data as an
“APP” (the marker data length representation is also 2 Byte).
The JPG-Marker injects data in these 14 application-spe-
cific markers, plus injecting the maximum amount of data in
the EXIF marker (“APP1”). It also creates one to many
“COMM” markers with data associated to it. The JFIF is left
untouched, since the majority of JPG validators fully read it.
A JPG file constructed by this encoder contains, at least,
1,048,560 Byte, having 983,025 Byte of the “APP1..15” and
at least 65,535 Byte of one “COMM” marker. As a parame-
ter, it is possible to add more “COMM” markers for testing
purposes.
PNG Ancillary Chunks Encoder (PNG-Chunks). The
PNG-Chunks encoder injects data in non-mandatory PNG
header fields. A chunk is comparable to the JPG marker: it is
a data structure expressed after the PNG header [20] that con-
veys certain information about the image. The chunk con-
sists of four parts: length (4 Byte), chunk type/name (4 Byte),
chunk data (length in bytes), and CRC (Cyclic Redundancy
Code, 4 Byte).
In order to store data, this encoder uses the chunks entitled
“iTXt” and “tEXt”. According to the standard both chunks
store text, with one name/value pair for each — being possi-
ble to have multiple “tEXt” in the same PNG file. In fact, the
data representation does not matter since the injected data in
these chunks is not displayed.
Due to the 4 Byte length representation, the implemented
encoder is able to inject 4 GByte of data in each specified
chunk. Therefore, as encoder parameters, it is possible to
specify how much data will be injected, and in which
name/value pairs (it can present multiple pairs, if needed).
Email Encoder (Email-Enc). Email-Enc was imple-
mented to explore the injection of data within the email body
and attachments. The implementation is trivial, since it is an
enhanced IMAP (Internet Message Access Protocol) email
client. The enhanced part that differs from a simple email cli-
ent is twofold. First, it takes data and transforms in a textual
representation to include in the email body (using UTF-8).
Second, it also takes data and put as an email attachment. The
Email-Enc has two parameters: the amount of data injected in
an email body and in the attachment part.
C.Appending-related Encoder
The Appending-related encoder group appends data in the
end of the file in order to check if CPs’ data validation checks
end-of-file markers. This group is classified with a low detec-
tion complexity since the file size can be calculated and end
of file markers are defined in standards.
Appender Encoder (Append-Enc). Append-Enc takes a
File Format Sample as input and appends data after its con-
tent data. Since some file formats do not have an explicit end-
of-file marker (e.g., MP3), it was created a specific marker to
separate the File Format Sample content data to the appended
data. The marker is the sequence of bytes “FF FF 01 FF 02
FF 03 FF 04” (hexadecimal). The amount of data to be
appended is configurable through a parameter. By default, the
Append-Enc appends the same amount of data as contained
in the File Format Sample. E.g., if a JPG file has 300 kByte,
the encoder appends more 300 kByte of data, resulting in a
file of 600 kByte. Based on the appender marker, the decoder
is able to retrieve the appended data. 
D.Proof of Concept System
Fig. 1 depicts the proof of concept system’s architecture.
The main component is the Test Case Implementation, where
the test automation is done. It has the responsibility to pre-
pare a file, push/retrieve to/from the SaaS application, and
check if what was pushed is identical to what was retrieved.
The File Type Provider has the responsibility to provide file
samples to the Test Case Implementation. E.g., if observed
that a certain SaaS application only accepts JPG images (Sec-
tion III-B, Step 1), then the Test Case Implementation
requests the File Type Provider a JPG file sample. The File
Type Provider selects a pre-defined file out of the specific
requested type. The Test Case Implementation interacts with
Encoders based on the File Type Sample. The Encoders Inter-
face has two methods: encode and decode. The encode takes
as input the File Type Sample since it needs a starting point
to encode data considering a file format. The File Type Sam-
ple is not a strictly mandatory input parameter, as it depends
on the test case. The output is a file that in terms of structure
is very similar to the File Type Sample. However, depending
on the Encoder Implementation, the file’s organizational and
content data might be modified to explore a certain fragility
in the data validation process.
The Test Case Implementation also interact with the Cloud
Service Interface. This software component is service-spe-
cific, and is implemented considering chosen CPs to perform
the test cases. For each CP, a Java library that implements
push and retrieve of data was used. Thus, the Test Case
Implementation delegate the responsibility to push or retrieve
the files to specific libraries that directly interact to CSs.
V. TEST CASES
A. Chosen Cloud Providers
Table I lists chosen CPs, the selected CSs, and restrictions
that matter to encoders and for tests. Note that even if restric-
tions can change anytime, they were considered to elaborate
and perform the test cases. Table I was compiled according to
Step 1 of the presented test methodology in Section III-B, and
selection criteria in Section III-C.
B. Test Cases
All test cases follow the test method presented in Sec-
tion III-B. Step 2 of the test method describes the construc-
tion of data using different encoders. Therefore, test cases in
this section intend to specifically describe how the encoder is
applied to specific providers with different parameters (e.g.,
varying the used File Format Samples or the quantity of data
injected). Based on the test method, implemented encoders,
and chosen providers, the following test cases are described:
1) Encoder: JPG-PNG-Stega. Target: Google Picasa, Twit-
Pic, Facebook (FB) Photos, Imgur, ImageShack. Unique
test.
2) Encoder: WAV-Stega. Target: SoundCloud. Unique test.
TABLE I
SELECTION OF CLOUD PROVIDERS AND
CLOUD SERVICES, INCLUDING THEIR RESTRICTIONS
CP Service Restrictions
Google
Picasa
File Formats: JPG, TIFF, BMP, GIF, PSD, 
PNG, TGA. Images up to 800x800 pixels are 
not taken into consideration to the free storage 
(1 GByte). Images beyond 800x800 and up to 
2048x2048 are stored taking space within the 1 
GByte. File size: up to 20 MByte to upload.
GMail
Any text format in the email body. Any File 
Format as Attachment. The email should be up 
to 25 MByte.
Google+ 
Status 
Update
Up to 100,000 characters.
Google 
Docs
Documents: 1,024,000 characters. Uploaded 
document files that are converted to Google 
format should be up to 2 MByte.
Face-
book
(FB)
Status 
Update
63,206 characters
Photos
File formats: GIF, JPG, PNG, PSD, TIFF, JP2, 
IFF, WBMP, XBM. Up to 720x720 pixels (dis-
play). Up to 2048x2048 pixels to upload (but 
being resized afterwards). Album with a limit 
of 200 photos.
Sound-
Cloud
Sound-
Cloud 
Audio
File Formats: WAV, OGG, MP2, MP3, or 
WMA. Up to X minutes of audio. In the free 
account, up to 120 minutes.
TwitPic Image Service
File Formats: GIF, JPG, and PNG. Images up to 
10 MByte to upload.
Imgur ImageService
File Formats: JPG, GIF, PNG, etc. Most files 
are converted to PNG after the upload. Up to 
10 MByte to upload. However, if the image is 
over 1 Mbyte then it will automatically be 
compressed or resized to 1 MByte.
Image-
Shack
Image 
Service
File Formats: JPG, PNG, ICO, BMP, and TIFF. 
File size up to 5 MByte to upload (otherwise 
resized).
3) Encoder: TXT-Stega. Target: Facebook Status Update,
Google+ Status Update. Unique test.
4) Encoder: ID3-Tag. Target: SoundCloud. Test Cases:
4.a) ID3v2 tags with 50 MByte of data.
4.b) ID3v2 tags with 256 MByte of data.
4.c) ID3v2 tags with 300 MByte of data.
5) Encoder: JPG-Marker. Target: Google Picasa, TwitPic,
Facebook Photos, Imgur, ImageShack. All test cases con-
sider the aforementioned 14 “APPn” marker. For each tar-
get, the following test cases are performed:
5.a) JPG with 1 “COMM” marker.
5.b) JPG with 5 “COMM” markers.
5.c) JPG with 10 “COMM” markers.
5.d) JPG with 50 “COMM” markers.
5.e) JPG with 100 “COMM” markers.
6) Encoder: PNG-Chunks. Target: Google Picasa, TwitPic,
Facebook Photos, Imgur, ImageShack. For each target, the
following test cases are performed:
6.a) 1 name/value pair as “tEXt” with 250 kByte, and
“iTXt” with 250 kByte of data.
6.b)5 name/value pairs as “tEXt” with 250 kByte each,
and “iTXt” with 250 kByte of data.
6.c) 10 name/value pairs as “tEXt” with 250 kByte each,
and “iTXt” with 250 kByte of data.
6.d)20 name/value pair as “tEXt” with 1 MByte of data
each, and “iTXt” with 1 MByte of data.
6.e) no “tEXt”, and “iTXt” with 1 MByte of data.
7) Encoder: Email-Enc. Target: Google GMail. Test cases:
7.a) Email body: 25 MByte; no attachment.
7.b)Email body: 25 MByte; Attachment: 1 MByte.
7.c) Email body: 10 MByte; Attachment: 15 MByte.
7.d)No email body; Attachment: 5 MByte.
7.e) No email body; Attachment: 26 MByte.
8) Encoder: Append-Enc. Target: Google Picasa, Google
GMail, Google Docs, SoundCloud, TwitPic, Facebook
Photos, Imgur, ImageShack. For each target, use the
Appender Encoder to:
8.a) Append the double of the File Format Sample size.
8.b)Append 1 MByte of data.
8.c) Append 10 MByte of data.
8.d)Append 100 MByte of data.
VI. RESULTS
The test cases were performed and generated the results
shown in Table II, III, and IV. Within table cells, “N/A”
stands for “Non-Applicable”, meaning that a test case did not
target that specific CS; symbol “9” shows that the test case
was successful, meaning positive results in test methodology
Step 3, 4, 5, and 6 (Section III-B); and symbol “8” means
that test methodology Steps 3, 4, 5, or 6 were unsuccessful.
Test Cases 1, 2, and 3 were successful for the proposed tar-
gets. For Test Case 1 should be noted that image file restric-
tions were respected, since Steganography-related encoders
would be unsuccessful due to CPs’ image resizing after
upload. Test Case 4.c was unsuccessful due to the fact that
the pushed MP3 file does not follow ID3v2 standards. The
CP did not allow the audio file to be pushed (unsuccessful in
Step 4). Test Case 5 demonstrated to have different results
depending on the target. While Imgur accepted all files and
also made them available to be retrieved in its original form,
other CSs denied the upload (unsuccessful in Step 4). The
unsuccessful test cases targeting Google Picasa, TwitPic, and
Facebook Photos resulted in error messages such as “there
was a problem with the image file” or “file must be an image
or video”. The failed test case targeting ImageShack resulted
in a “file too big to be uploaded” error, since the total file size
surpassed CS restrictions.
Test Case 6 presented different results due to the follow-
ing reasons. When Picasa was targeted, it seems that the data
validation takes into consideration the existence of ancillary
chunks, mainly “iTXt” and “tEXt” (unsuccessful in Step 4).
When tried to perform an additional test case, where a PNG
file was uploaded with another type of ancillary chunk (con-
taining 1 MByte of data), the test was successful. Facebook
accepted to push the encoded files, but when they were
retrieved they did not contain the original data (unsuccessful
in Step 6). For the other targets, Test Case 6 was unsuccess-
ful when the CS had upload file size restrictions (unsuccess-
ful in Step 4). E.g., ImageShack just accepts 5 MByte,
TwitPic 10 MByte, and Imgur 1 MByte. Moreover, Imgur
resized the original files after the upload and therefore Test
Cases 6.b, 6.c, and 6.d were unsuccessful (Step 6): the
retrieved file was not the same as the original.
Within Test Case 7, GMail demonstrated to be coherent to
the employed restrictions, not presenting data validation
issues. However, combining the Email-Enc with Steganogra-
phy-, FileHeaderFormat-, and Appender-related encoders, it
was possible to retrieve hidden information persisted in email
body and attachment files.
Test Case 8 demonstrated to be successful even though it is
the most trivial encoder to detect and prevent. For Picasa,
GMail, Docs, TwitPic, Imgur, and ImageShack, Test Cases
8.d and 8.c was unsuccessful due to the upload file size
restriction and not due to the used encoder. Thus, the encoded
Fig. 1. Proof of Concept System’s Architecture.
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file was not even accepted for upload (unsuccessful in Step
4). Facebook Photos accepted to upload the files. But within
Step 5 and 6 the data validation transformed the image files
and cut the appended data.
VII. DISCUSSION
A. Security Impacts
The performed tests identified a considerable security
impact: unawareness of persisted content. This is related to
security since CPs may distribute data (e.g., by sharing a pic-
ture, or turning public an audio file) that they do not filter and
are not aware of. CPs may face legal issues due to the distri-
bution of, e.g., illegal content under the jurisdiction where the
data is persisted. Nowadays CPs have multiple datacenter
facilities around the globe, employing a Content Delivery
Network (CDN) to distribute/replicate data where is appro-
priated (based on, e.g., content rules). If these content rules
do not take the injected data into consideration, CDNs are
prone to take unappropriated distribution/replication actions.
A typical example to illustrate this impact can be observed if
a user persists copyrighted software into a CP and publicly
share it — assuming people know how to decode and get the
injected data out of the encoded file. Malicious users can
benefit from CP unawareness to build, e.g., a peer-to-peer
software that is able to encode, persist in different CPs, share,
and decode any kind of data, independent of content type.
As long as data validation processes remain ill-defined,
and malicious users exploit it in a large scale, other security
impacts as application failures and Denial-of-Service may be
observed. E.g., after the data validation, the SaaS application
may process the file to display in the Website, or add func-
tions as image editing. If the whole process is not consistent,
the CS can suffer faults due to unexpected organizational and
content data that bypassed the data validation process.
B. Accounting and Charging Impacts
In two test cases, the chosen CPs suffered impacts in their
accounting and charging systems. Google Picasa provides a
free account with 1 GByte of storage. Table I shows that
“images up to 800x800 pixels are not taken into consider-
ation to the free storage (1 GByte), and images from 800x800
up to 2048x2048 pixels are stored consuming space within
the 1 GByte space”. The Test Cases 1, 5, and 8 used images
with a resolution below 800x800, injecting data, but not
enhancing the File Format Sample resolution. After upload-
ing the encoded image files, the account space consumption
remained with 1 GByte, even if the encoded images were
very large. This means that, by exploiting the data validation
process, users are able to store any data without being
accounted and charged for — since the free 1 GByte of stor-
age remains unused.
SoundCloud provides a free account with 120 minutes
with audio storage. Test Case 4 is able to store MP3 audio
files with 10 seconds and 256 MByte. An MP3 file, with
sample rate of 44,100 Hz, bit rate of 128 kbit/s, no ID3v2
tags, and 10 seconds, consumes on average 150 kByte. A free
account is intended to store 720 MP3 files with 10 seconds
each, consuming ~105 MByte; however, by employing the
ID3-Tag encoder, it was possible to consume up to 180
GByte with the same amount of files.
In both cases a considerable additional amount of data may
be stored in CPs’ servers without additional charges — since
data volume is not accounted and not considered by the data
validation process.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The carried exploratory tests introduce a novel problem in
the area of CC, which could be observed in several on-pro-
duction SaaS applications. The results showed that, depend-
ing on the CP, CS, and used encoder, it is possible to store
arbitrary data into the investigated CPs, bypassing the data
validation process, thus causing impacts in security, account-
ing, and charging.
Surprisingly, even non-sophisticated techniques as the ones
implemented in FileFormatHeader- and Appender-related
encoders demonstrated to be successful. CPs should concen-
trate their efforts enhancing data validation algorithms to
detect the use of encoders that are easier to circumvent but
can lead to a larger amount of data being stored — compared
to steganography, that requires a high complexity to detect.
Even though the use of steganography can always bypass
CPs’ data validation, the amount of injected data was not as
high as when using other encoders.
Within accounting and charging impacts, this paper has
identified a novel dependency relation between application-
specific accounting attributes (e.g., image resolution, audio
length) and what the data validation process takes into con-
sideration. CPs should verify whether values declared in
headers reasonably correspond to the amount of resources
consumed. E.g., can a 10 second-long MP3 file, with the best
possible audio quality, have 256+ MByte if a considerable
amount of data is not present in optional headers? Even
though data validation rules should follow standards (thus,
being possible, e.g., to use 256 MByte just for ID3v2 tags),
absurd imbalances between what is declared and what is con-
sumed should be taken into consideration.
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As future work, it is important to understand the complex-
ity of preventing usage of the encoders classified in this
paper. Finally, the possibility and scalability of building a
P2P system to store and share arbitrary data from SaaS appli-
cations shall be investigated.
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